Aberrations of self-experience are considered a core feature of borderline personality disorder (BPD). While prominent aetiological accounts of BPD, such as the mentalization-based approach, appeal to the developmental constitution of self in early infant–caregiver environments, they often rely on a conception of self that is not explicitly articulated. Moreover, self-experience in BPD is often theorized at the level of narrative identity, thus minimizing the role of embodied experience. In this article, we present the hypothesis that disordered self and interpersonal functioning (...) in BPD result, in part, from impairments in 'embodied mentalization' that manifest foundationally as alterations in minimal embodied selfhood, i.e. the first-person experience of being an individuated embodied subject. This account of BPD, which engages early intersubjective experiences, has symptomatic findings in BPD, and is consistent with contemporary theories of brain function. (shrink)

Although we believe the results reported below to have direct philosophical import, we shall for the most part confine our remarks to the realm of mathematics. The reader is referred to [4] for a philosophically oriented discussion, comprehensible to mathematicians, of tense logic.The “minimal” tense logicT0is the system having connectives ∼, →,F(“at some future time”), andP(“at some past time”); the following axioms:(whereGandHabbreviate ∼F∼ and ∼P∼ respectively); and the following rules:(8) fromαandα → β, inferβ,(9) fromα, infer any substitution instance ofα,(10) fromα, (...) inferGα,(11) fromα, inferHα.A tense logic is a systemTwhose language is that ofT0and whose axioms and rules include (1)–(11). The axioms and rules ofTother than (1)–(11) are calledproperaxioms and rules.We shall investigate three systems of semantics for tense logics, i.e. three notions ofstructureand three relations ⊧ which stand between structures and formulas. One reads⊧αas “αis valid in.” A structureis amodelof a tense logicTif every formula provable inTis valid in. A semantics isadequateforTif the set of models ofTin the semantics is characteristic forT, i.e. if wheneverT ∀ αthen there is a modelofTin the semantics such that∀ α. Two structuresand, possibly from different semantics, are calledequivalent(∼) if exactly the same formulas are valid inas in. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XX, Number 2, November 1994, pp. 261-287 Collingwood's Understanding of Hume S. K. WERTZ What was David Hume's reception in the British idealistic tradition? In this paper, I shall contribute a short chapter on this question by examining Hume's place in R. G. Collingwood's thought.1 Such an examination has been lacking in the literature, so what follows is a comprehensive study of Collingwood's use of Hume (...) throughout all of R.G.'s writings. I shall mainly focus on two main, unrelated discussions of Hume: first is the theory of the imagination which primarily occurs in The Principles of Art, and second is the set of relations between human nature and human history which is principally found in The Idea of History. These sections will be followed by a section on minor discussions and omissions and a conclusion. It is a common misconception that Collingwood (1889-1943) has little to offer Hume scholarship, and I wish to amend that here. Actually, Collingwood has good insights into the nature of the imagination and its role in human understanding, besides instructive thoughts on Hume on human nature and history, even though his discussion of the latter is flawed. This essay serves both historical and philosophical purposes. It is to sample Hume's place in early twentieth century British idealism at a time when he began to emerge as an important philosophical figure worthy of careful study. (By "idealism," I mean the philosophical movement which takes ideas to be an irreducible part of the world and whose program is opposed to both materialism and realism.) So Collingwood's portrait is historically interesting. But over and above this, it carries significant philosophical amendments, S. K. Wertz is at the Department of Philosophy, Texas Christian University, Box 30781, Fort Worth, TX 76129 USA. e-mail: [email protected] 262 S. K. Wertz criticisms, and suggestions about Hume's thought and the eighteenth century intellectual climate. Collingwood has mostly been studied as a philosopher of history or as an aesthetician, but not in toto from the perspective of one of the historical figures to whom he is deeply indebted. Such a view affords a portrait of Hume that is instructive and rewarding. The comparison of Hume and Collingwood lead us to finer appreciation of both philosophers. Let us first look at Collingwood's positive contribution. Imagination Collingwood begins his analysis by declaring his intentions: I shall...try to show that there are such things, to be with what Hume (whose account of them I shall take as my starting-point) called 'ideas' as distinct from 'impressions'. I shall try to show that there is a special activity of mind correlative to them, and that this is what we generally call imagination, as distinct from sensation on the one hand and intellect on the other. (PA 170-71, emphasis added) Why would Collingwood start with Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas? Undoubtedly, this means that Collingwood is willing to accept the validity of the distinction and to build on it. Isn't this a strange place for an idealist to begin? Not really. When we look at British philosophy at the turn of this century, we find idealists preoccupied with the distinction,2 so it is not extraordinary to find Collingwood utilizing it to some extent. Like most Oxford students of the time, Collingwood read Locke, Berkeley, and Hume in his undergraduate program. Consequently we find them in the problems he addresses. "It was Hume who first perceived the [Lockean] problem [of confusing sensation with imagination]," Collingwood attributes, "and tried to solve it by distinguishing ideas from impressions" (PA 200). In detail: He [Hume] was right when he laid it down that the immediate concern of thought is not with impressions but with ideas; that it is ideas, not impressions, that are associated with one another and thus built up into the fabric of knowledge; and that ideas, though 'derived' from impressions, are not mere relics of them like an after-taste of onions or an after-image of the sun (as Lockeans like Condillac supposed), but something different in kind: different, if not in what he... (shrink)

A set S of degrees is said to be an initial segment if c ≤ d ∈ S→-c∈S. Shoenfield has shown that if P is the lattice of all subsets of a finite set then there is an initial segment of degrees isomorphic to P. Rosenstein [2] (independently) proved the same to hold of the lattice of all finite subsets of a countable set. We shall show that “countable set” may be replaced by “set of cardinality at most that of (...) the continuum.” This result is also an extension of [3, Corollary 2 to Theorem 15], which states that there is a sublattice of degrees isomorphic to the lattice of all finite subsets of 2N. (A sublattice of degrees is a subset closed under ∪ and ∩; an initial segment closed under ∪ is necessarily a sublattice, but not conversely.)It seems worth noting that the proof of the present result was preceded in time by our proof [4] of the analogous theorem for hyperdegrees, and is in fact an adaptation of that proof. Thus the present work has been influenced much more directly by the Gandy-Sacks forcing construction of a minimal hyperdegree [1] than by previous work on initial segments of degrees. (shrink)

R. G. Collingwood (1889–1943) had several arguments that analyzed race in history and anthropology. These appear mainly in Roman Britain (both in theory and practice of history), The Idea of History, and The Principles of History. This latter work, which is fairly new to Collingwood scholarship (1999), contains the most important arguments. Collingwood argued that race is grounded in the historical process and this includes a people's environment, more so than genetics or evolution. He used the nature of art as (...) an example in his main argument. This spills over in his view of anthropology—in particular physical anthropology that was influenced by John Beddoe. His view is contrasted with Claude Lévi-Strauss who held that physical anthropology is at the forefront of social or cultural anthropology which follows its lead. Whereas Collingwood held that in studying blood types, skulls, and bones, 'one does not get inside the object or recreate its object inside itself.' Consequently, cultural anthropology will always provide the key to racial considerations. What is revealed is that emotions and rationality are the same across cultures; also, that superiority/inferiority claims about race are mythical and lead us into darkness and superstition. (shrink)

By focusing on the known details of Laonikos Chalkokondyles’ biography, on his relation to Byzantine historiographical tradition, by comparing his historical work to that of contemporary intellectuals living under the Ottomans as well as those in the west, examining his portrayal of Mehmed II, his adoption of a Herodotean model, the revival of Herodotus in the Renaissance more generally, and the reception of the ᾿Aπόδειξις in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, I argue that Laonikos was writing for an elite circle (...) of Byzantine émigrés and other intellectuals with access to classical Greek in the west, rather than for the post- Byzantine intellectuals associated with the Ottoman court. (shrink)

CHAPTER ONE Paving a Way for a Treatise Identity Those who are not of the philosophical persuasion may find it surprising that the Self appears to be such ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Art's DetourA Clash of Aesthetic TheoriesS. K. Wertz (bio)Both John Dewey1 and Martin Heidegger2 thought that art's audience had to take a detour in order to appreciate or understand a work of art. They wrote about this around the same time (mid-1930s) and independently of one another, so this similar circumstance in the history of aesthetics is unusual since they come from very different philosophical traditions. What was it (...) about the climate of the times that led them to such an idea? Is it still viable today? Both philosophers thought that art's audience is not in a position to immediately appreciate works of art—that we are missing something for a direct appreciation or apprehension—so we must take a detour. Why the detours and what are they? Are the detours similar? And are Dewey and Heidegger right about this? The essay that unfolds below attempts to answer these questions.First a definition is in order so we know what the term "detour" means when I use it. What is a detour? It is a deviation from a direct course or the usual procedure; a roundabout way temporarily replacing part of a route; in other words, a bypass or a roundabout way to some destination. The Little Oxford Dictionary adds a different twist on my characterization: "a course that leaves and rejoins [the] direct route."3 Applying this idea to art, we can say that a detour describes an audience who ordinarily perceives an artwork is a legitimate beginning for an appreciation of it, but that course must be bypassed for another (conception) before it can rejoin the direct route (perception). In other words, perceptions in the aesthetic experience must be aided by conceptions—a decidedly Kantian stance taken by Dewey and Heidegger. Their illustrations make my interpretation plausible.One of Heidegger's examples is Van Gogh's painting of a pair of peasant boots.4 He selects this painting to illustrate his metaphysics, which centers around the notion of "equipment." Peasant boots are equipment in [End Page 100] the sense that they are worn or used; the mere thing (like shoes or boots in a store [exhibited] or a closet [in storage]) disappears in use and becomes equipment. Between equipment and mere things—these two categories of being—are artworks. They are pictorial representations of equipment (in Heidegger's illustration; a pair of shoes as mere things could be a pictorial representation, like an advertisement, but it wouldn't be the same). Through the painted boots, a world comes into focus—a network of meaning. The world Heidegger sees in the Van Gogh painting is captured in the following descriptions: "In the vicinity of the [art]work we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be…. The art work let us know what shoes are in truth" (ATCR 233). So the nature of art is still a question about the nature of representation for Heidegger: it is what the shoes disclose to us about human existence. As he says, it is not just merely a pair of shoes portrayed but shoes "from the dark opening of the worn insides … the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth" (ATCR 232). In other words, we see the difficult labor that this particular owner toiled with in her daily chores.In Tralbaut's book, he quotes Heidegger in a caption alongside the painting: "Engraving in the intimate obscurity of the hollow of a boot is the weariness of the steps of work. The rough and solid weight of the clog tells of the slow and obstinate trudge across the fields."5 Heidegger continues in the same vein:In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of... (shrink)

Горобец К. В. Аксиосфера права: философский и юридический дискурс : моногр. / К. В. Горобец. – Одесса : Фенікс, 2013. – 218 с. Монография посвящена философско-правовым аспектам аксиосферы права, которая предстает в качестве структурного компонента права и выражается в виде центрированной системы правовых ценностей и иерархизированной системы ценностей права. Правовые ценности рассматриваются как феномены, являющиеся одновременно компонентами права и способом его постижения. Ценности права понимаются как блага, которые защищаются и обеспечиваются правом в силу их значимости для человека и общества. Доказывается, (...) что аксиосфера права существует наряду с нормосферой права. При этом их целостность обеспечивается посредством особого феномена – верховенства права. Монография будет полезна специалистам в сфере философии права, общетеоретической юриспруденции, отраслевых юридических наук, а также всем, кто интересуется проблемами развития современного права. (shrink)

This volume brings together essays that discuss and contextualise Gandhi's ideas on pluralism, religious identity, non-violence, satyagraha, and modernity. It interrogates the epistemic foundations of Gandhian thinking and weltanschauung, identifies diverse strands within his arguments, and gives it new meaning in contemporary society. This book focuses on Gandhi's engagements with religious, political, and social conflicts; his reflections on faith and modernity; and his argumentative dialogues with Mohammad Ali Jinnah and B. R. Ambedkar. It provides critical insights into Gandhi's philosophy and (...) suggests ways of engaging with his ethical and moral ideas in contemporary intellectual and political discourse. Comparing and contrasting Gandhian thought and strategies with contemporary issues and conceptions of religious freedom, conflict resolution, and liberalism, the volume reformulates and reconstitutes his intellectual and political legacy. This book points to new and possible future directions of research on Gandhian concepts and will be useful for scholars in the fields of political science, Gandhian studies, sociology, and philosophy. (shrink)

We eat not only because it is necessary for us to, but also and much more because eating gives us pleasure.In this essay, I develop a case for G. W. Leibniz as our first modern food philosopher. It is in his theory of perception and in his culinary examples that I find the most convincing evidence, especially when I contrast them with Locke and Hume’s account of perception with reference to food. In the process, Leibniz expanded aesthetic perception to include (...) nature and food. He did not draw a distinction between ordinary or regular perception and aesthetic perception; perceiving smells and tastes are similar to perceiving colors—both have structures,2 but more on.. (shrink)